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Abstract	
This	paper	examines	some	conceptual	issues	for	library	and	information	science	
(LIS),	with	a	focus	on	how	they	have	been	treated	in	the	scholarship	of	Rafael	
Capurro,	based	on	a	selective	literature	analysis.	Three	topics	are	examined.	First,	
the	concept	of	information	is	considered,	with	particular	reference	on	the	value	of	
theoretical	approaches	for	LIS,	and	with	emphasis	on	a	comparison	of	Capurro’s	
approach	with	those	of	Popper	and	of	Floridi.	Second,	the	nature	of	the	information-
centric	disciplines	is	considered,	with	particular	reference	to	Capurro's		conception	
of	a	conjoined	LIS	discipline,	rooted	in	the	humanities.	Third,	Capurro’s	ideas	of	
digital	ontology	and	digital	hermeneutics	are	outlined,	with	emphasis	on	their	value	
in	providing	a	theoretical	background	for	studying	the	new	generation	of	immersive	
multisensory	documents.	It	is	concluded	that	the	kind	of	rigorous	study	of	
foundational	issues	which	characterises	Capurro’s	work	will	be	of	even	greater	
importance	for	the	LIS	discipline	in	the	future.	
	
	
Introduction	
Rafael	Capurro’s	body	of	writings	encompass	a	wide	and	diverse	set	of	issues	of	
importance	to	information	science,	but	within	them	one	may	identify	a	number	of	
recurring	themes.	In	this	paper	we	identify	and	discuss	three	of	these	themes,	basing	
our	analysis	of	some	of	Capurro’s	own	writings	and	on	a	highly	selective	review	of	
recent	literature.	We	first,	and	at	most	length,	consider	the	nature	of	information	
itself,	following	Capurro’s	insistence	on	the	importance	of	a	clear	understanding	of	
this	foundational	concept,	and	focusing	on	epistemological	aspects.	We	then	
examine	the	nature	of	the	disciplines	which	have	this	concept	as	their	focus,	and	
examine	Capurro’s	advocacy	of	a	conjoined	discipline	of	library	and	information	
science	(LIS).	Finally,	we	look	briefly	at	the	way	in	which	this	discipline	may	develop	
in	the	future,	again	following	Capurro’s	imaginative	and	forward-looking	ideas.	It	has	
to	be		said	that	Capurro’s	ideas	are	not	always	easy	to	come		to	grips	with;	but	as	
Luciano	Floridi,	with	whom	Capurro	has	had	a	somewhat	combative	relationship,	has	
pointed	out	(Floridi	2008),	there	is	much	of	value	to	be	found	there,	even	for	the	
less-philosophically	inclined	LIS	scholar	or	student.	
		
The	nature	of	information	
A	constant	theme	running	through	Capurro’s	writings	has	been	that	of	the	value	of	a	
clear	understanding	of	the	idea	of	information,	as	he	sets	out	to	“undertake	the	task	
of	exploring	the	past,	present	and	future	of	the	concept	of	information”	(Capurro	
2009,	p.	126).	This	recurs	in	a	number	of	his	publications,	but	is	particularly	focused	
in	an	influential	review,	‘The	concept	of	information’,	which	had	been	cited	over	100	
times	by	mid-2015	(Capurro	and	Hjørland	2003)	and	in	an	article	derived	from	it	
(Capurro	2009).	
	
The	concept	of	information	is	widely,	and	increasingly,	used	in	a	variety	of	
disciplines,	many	far	removed	from	LIS.	Capurro	and	Hjørland	(2003)	argue	that	it	is	
important	for	LIS	to	consider	the	way	the	concept	is	used	in	different	disciplines,	not	
least	because	many	of	theoretical	approaches	in	LIS	have	their	origins	in	other	
subjects.	
	
Capurro	is	in	company	with	a	number	of	other	authors	in	noting	the	ways	in	which	
the	word	‘information’	has	been	used	over	time;	see,	for	example,	Schrader	(1983,	
1986),	Bawden	(2001),	Díaz	Nafría	(2010)	and	Furner	(2013).	A	detailed	analysis	of	
the	linguistic	roots	of	the	term,	and	of	the	usage	of	the	concept	since	classical	times,	
shows	a	change	in	its	meaning,	and	in	particular	of	a	continuing	duality	between	an	
objective	and	subjective	implication	of	the	term	(Capurro	and	Hjørland	2003,	
Capurro	2009).	This	complexity	in	meaning	has	led	to	what	has	been	termed	
‘Capurro’s	trilemma’,	with	three	options	for	understanding	the	idea	of	information	
(Capurro,	Fleissner	and	Hofkirchner,	1999):	
● univocity:	the	concept	of	information	has	the	same	meaning	in	all	contexts	
● analogy:	the	concept	of	information	has	an	original	meaning	in	a	specific	
context,	and	is	applied	as	an	analogy	in	other	domains	
● equivocity:	the	concept	of	information	has	different,	but	equally	valid,	
meanings	in	different	contexts	
	
The	implication	of	this	is	that	a	truly	unified	theory	of	information	is	impossible,	
since,	whichever	of	these	options	is	adopted,	no	satisfactory	theory	can	result	
(Treude,	2015).	The	first	option	loses	all	sensible	distinction,	so	that	biochemical	
processes	and	the	composition	of	an	email	are	‘the	same’;	the	second	relies	for	unity	
on	loose	and	perhaps	anthropomorphic	analogy,	such	that	we	may	say	that	
molecules	‘talk	to	each	other’	in	a	manner	analogous	to	that	which	people	do;	and	
the	third	abandons	from	the	start	any	intent	at	unification.	
	
In	assessing	the	trilemma,	almost	twenty	years	on	from	its	first	formulation,	it	still	
appears	to	capture	much	of	the	difficulties	of	understanding	the	concept	of	
information.	The	first	option	appears	so	reductive	as	to	be	of	no	value,	and	yet	it	is,	
presumably,	the	one	which	would	have	to	be	pursued	in	setting	any	single	theory	of	
information	for	all	domains,	at	least	in	any	scientific	sense	of	‘theory’.	We	must	
agree	with	Furner	(2010)	that	the	prospects	for	any	such	‘one	size	fits	all’	theory	of	
information	are	not	good.	The	second	is	undeniably	true:	there	are	original	and	clear	
meanings	of	information	in	specific	contexts	–	the	Shannon	measure	most	obviously	
–	and	such	meanings	are	indeed	applied	analogously	or	metaphorically.	But	analogy	
and	metaphor,	though	they	may	aid	understanding,	are	hardly	components	of	any	
theory	worth	the	name.	The	third,	while	defensible,	necessarily	ignores	valuable	
insights	into	similarities	between	differing	concepts	of	information,	and	results	–	at	
best	–	in	a	multiplicity	of	theories	of	information,	all	resolutely	separate,	and	without	
hope	of	any	cross-fertilisation.			
		
One	solution	could	be	to	declare	one	concept	of	information	to	be	primary,	and	
require	all	others	to	relate	to	it;	essentially	option	two,	but	with	the	relations	being	
more	than	analogies.	Capurro	rejects	this	idea,	and	prefers	to	accept,	in	option	
three,	the	existence,	on	equal	terms,	of	different	concepts	of	information	in	different	
domains,	and	then	to	establish	their	relationships	through	a	Wittgensteinian	
language	game	approach,	seeking	family	resemblances	(Treude,	2015).	More	
specifically,	he	recommends	a	concept	of	information	that	“connects,	without	
leveling	[sic]	differences”,	human	and	non-human	angeletic	phenomena”	(Capurro,	
2009,	p.	137),	‘angeletic’	implying	some	form	of	message.	He	notes	that	this	has	
some	commonality	with,	without	being	the	same	as,	Brier’s	‘cybersemiotic’	approach	
to	a	unified	theory	of	information,	which	also	emphasises	communication	and	
meaning	(Brier,	2008,	2013).	
	
This	approach,	while	attractive	in	many	respects,	is	limited	to	finding	relations	
through	use	of	language,	and	is	therefore	far	from	establishing	any	objective	
relations.	The	focus	on	messages	is	also	not	self-evidently	appropriate	in	all	contexts.	
While	Capurro	(2009)	shows	convincingly	that	objective	measures	of	information,	
such	as	that	of	Shannon,	may	be	understood	in	terms	of	messages,	his	suggested	
extension	to	thermodynamics,	via	the	ideas	of	Weizsäcker,	do	not	seem	fully	
convincing,	other	than	as	analogies.	There	is	a	good	deal	to	be	said	about	the	
relation	between	information	and	entropy,	complexity	and	similar	physical	concepts	
(Bawden	and	Robinson	2015A,	2015B),	but	it	is	not	yet	evident	that	this	is	best	
expressed	in	terms	of	messages	and	messengers.	
			
A	rather	more	general	approach	has	been	outlined	by	Robinson	and	Bawden	(2013).	
This	involves	accepting,	as	in	option	three,	the	distinct	information	concepts	in	
different	domains,	and	then	seeking	to	find	relations	–	to	bridge	the	gaps	between	
concepts	–	by	more	than	simply	linguistic	means.	There	are,	it	seems,	two	kinds	of	
gaps:	those	between	the	concepts;	and	those	between	scholars	who	think	it	
worthwhile	to	try	to	bridge	such	gaps	and	those	who	do	not.		
	
Two	examples	can	be	given	of	such	‘gap	bridging’	attempts.	Stonier,	taking	a	general	
view	of	information	as	an	abstract	force	promoting	organization	in	systems	of	all	
kinds,	proposed	evolutionary	links	between	information	in	the	physical	and	
biological	domains,	and	then	between	information	in	the	biological	and	social	realms	
(Stonier	1990,	1992,	1997).	Bates,	again	claiming	an	evolutionary	perspective,	
related	five	information-like	entities	in	the	physical,	biological	and	social	domains	
(Bates	2005,	2006).	She	categorised	these	as:	
● Information	1	–	the	pattern	of	organization	of	matter	and	energy	
● Information	2	–	some	pattern	of	organization	of	matter	and	energy	given	
meaning	by	a	living	being	
● Data	1	–	that	portion	of	the	entire	information	environment	available	to	a	
sensing	organism	that	is	taken	in,	or	processed,	by	that	organism	
● Data	2	–	information	selected	or	generated	by	human	beings	for	social	
purposes	
● Knowledge	–	information	given	meaning	and	integrated	with	other	contents	
of	understanding	
	
While	it	is	fair	to	say	that	neither	of	the	approaches	of	Stonier	or	of	Bates	has	met	
with	general	acceptance,	they	are	an	early	indication	of	the	kind	of	gap	bridging	that	
may	be	possible.		
	
A	gap	bridging	exercise	of	a	rather	different	nature	is	Floridi’s	Philosophy	of	
Information.	Starting	with	Shannon	theory	as	a	basis,	this	develops,	by	philosophical	
analysis,	a	general	theory	for	biological,	environmental	and	semantic	information	
(Floridi	2010,	2011).	Floridi’s	ideas	will	be	mentioned	later,	as	the	only	current	
general	model	of	information	directly	applicable	to	the	concerns	of	LIS.	
	
Despite	his	interest	in	other	disciplines’	use	of	the	information	concept,	Capurro	
invariably	returns	to	a	focus	on	how	LIS	should	view	the	idea.	This	has	involved	a	
restriction	on	the	scope	of	the	information	concept:	“one	thing	seems	to	be	clear:	
the	notion	of	information	in	our	field	is	explicitly	referred	and	restricted	to	the	
human	sphere.	This	means	a(n)	(implicit)	rejection	of	information	science	in	the	
sense	of	a	super-science	whose	object	is	information	at	all	levels	of	reality”	(Capurro		
1991,	p.	83).	The	most	important	concept	within	information	science	is	not	
information	itself,	but	the	human	being:	information	is	a	“fundamental	dimension	of	
human	existence”,	and	its	use	to	share	knowledge	is	a	“way	of	being”	(Capurro	1991,	
p.	83).	Information	is	what	is	informative	for	a	given	person,	and	the	most	important	
perspective	for	LIS	is	to	view	information	as	a	constitutive	force	in	human	society	
(Capurro	and	Hjørland	2003).	This	is	very	much	in	line	with	the	ideas	of	Hjørland,	
who	argues	forcefully	against	the	relevance	of	objective	conceptions	of	information	
for	LIS,	and	hence	against	gap	bridging	models	which	incorporate	such	conceptions	
(Hjørland	2007,	2008).	
	
Capurro	has	been	generally	critical	of	all	the	conceptions	of	information	commonly	
used	within	LIS;	this	tendency	to	challenge	common	assumptions	and	models	is	one	
of	the	more	intellectually	pleasing	aspects	of	his	scholarship.	Ma	(2012),	for	
example,	identifies	three	leading	foundational	theories	of	information	of	relevance	
to	LIS:	the	quantitative	information	theory	developed	by	Nyquist,	Hartley	and	
Shannon;	Popper’s	Three	Worlds	epistemology;	and	the	data-information-
knowledge-wisdom	hierarchy.	Capurro	has	found	reason	to	criticise	all	of	these	at	
some	time.			
	
Capurro	and	Hjørland	(2003)	noted,	seemingly	approvingly,	the	overall	tendency	to	
regard	the	mathematical	theory	of	information	as	a	blind	alley	for	LIS;	and	indeed	
Shannon’s	objective	conception	of	information	sits	ill	with	Capurro’s	focus	on	human	
information,	although	he	does,	as	noted	above,	include	Shannon	theory	within	his	
message-centric	approach	to	information	(Capurro	2009).		
	
As	regards	the	well-known	data-information-knowledge-wisdom	hierarchy	(Rowley	
2007),	Capurro	regards	it	as	problematic,	since	it	is	unclear	how	each	level	emerges	
from	the	one	below	(Treude	2015).	Similar	criticisms	have	been	made	by	others,	
such	as	Frické	(2009),	and	Randles,	Blades	and	Fadlalla	(2012),	who	regard	it	
nonetheless	as	a	valuable	metaphor.	
	
The	third	foundational	theory,	Karl	Popper’s	Three	Worlds	ontology,	stems	from	his	
ideas	of	‘objective	epistemology’	and	‘knowledge	without	a	knowing	subject’	
(Popper	1979).	This	holds	that	all	information-related	entities,	and	for	that	matter	
everything	else	in	the	world,	falls	into	three	categories,	which	Popper	terms	
‘Worlds’:	
● World	I	is	the	physical	world,	of	people,	books,	computers,	buildings,	etc.		
● World	2	is	the	internal,	subjective	mental	state	of	an	individual,	including	
their	personal	knowledge		
● World	3	is	the	world	of	objective	knowledge,	which	may	be	communicated	
between	people	by	means	of	information	stored	in	documents.		
	
This	framework	was	adopted	enthusiastically	by	Brookes,	who	announced	it	as	the	
most	appropriate	philosophical	foundation	for	the	information	sciences	(Brookes	
1980).	The	task	of	the	information	sciences	was	to	understand	World	3	of	objective	
knowledge,	as	instantiated	in	World	1	objects	–	documents	of	all	kinds	-	and	its	
interactions	with	the	cognition	of	the	user,	Popper's	World	2.	Popper’s	views	were	
criticised,	in	philosophy	generally	and	in	their	LIS	application	specifically,	as	an	
unnecessary	'mystification',	introducing	spurious	and	unnecessary	complexity:	see,	
for	example,	Neill	(1982)	and	Rudd	(1983).		
	
Capurro	(1991)	and	Capurro	and	Hjørland	(2003)	support	Rudd	(1983)	in	arguing	that	
Popper’s	World	3	is	not	needed	to	explain	information	processes.	They	note	an	
overall	tendency	in	information	science	to	prefer	Peirce’s	semiotic	viewpoint	to	
Popper’s	metaphysical	pluralism;	informative	objects	are	signs	(World	1	phenomena	
in	Popper’s	terms	which	trigger	responses	in	other	World	1	objects).	
	
However,	attitudes	seem	to	be	changing:	as	Nutturno	(2000,	p.	139	and	145)	says	
"most	contemporary	philosophers	regard	World	3	as	an	unfortunate	product	of	
Popper's	old	age:	as	incoherent,	irrelevant	and	perhaps,	if	the	truth	be	told,	a	bit	
ridiculous	…	[but]	..	most	philosophers	who	reject	Popper's	theory	of	World	3	simply	
do	not	understand	it".	Popper’s	ideas	have	been	shown	to	have	value	for	LIS	
purposes	(Bawden	2002,	2007,	Abbott	2004),	and	are	cited	as	foundational	for	LIS	in	
recent	textbooks	and	reviews	(Davis	and	Shaw	2011,	Ma	2012,	Bawden	and	
Robinson	2012).	There	is	also	a	considerable	similarity	with	the	influential	
framework	of	Buckland	(1991),	which	distinguished	three	aspects	of	information:		
● information-as-thing,	where	the	information	is	associated	with	a	document	
● information-as-process,	where	the	information	is	that	which	changes	a	
person's	knowledge	state	
● information-as-knowledge,	where	the	information	is	equated	with	the	
knowledge	which	it	imparts.		
These	have	evident	similarity	with	Popper’s	Worlds	1,	2	and	3	respectively	(Robinson	
2015a).	It	therefore	seems	that	Capurro,	with	other	commentators,	may	have	
underestimated	the	value	of	Popper’s	ontology	as	a	natural	conceptual	framework	
for	LIS.	
	
Capurro	(2008A,	p.	170)	also	criticises	Floridi’s	idea	of	the	‘infosphere’	in	much	the	
same	way,	describing	it	as	“a	kind	of	Popperian	‘immaterial	world’”.	While	Floridi	
tells	us	that	Popper’s	objective	epistemology	was	an	initial	inspiration	for	this	
philosophy	of	information	(Warburton	2015),	the	two	are	hardly	the	same.	And	it	
should	be	noted	that	Floridi	himself	dissents	from	much	of	Capurro’s	commentary	
on	Floridi’s	information	ethics,	and	on	his	philosophy	of	information	generally	
(Floridi	2008,	pp.	199-201).	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	Capurro	is	able	to	fit	
Floridi’s	‘informational	objects’	within	his	message-centred	idea	of	information	
(Capurro	2009).		
	
Floridi	himself	claimed	a	close	relation	between	his	philosophy	and	LIS,	which	he	
described	at	one	point	as	‘applied	philosophy	of	information’	(Floridi	2002).	
Although	this	idea	met	with	some	resistance,	various	authors	have	suggested	that	
Floridi’s	philosophy	may	indeed	provide	a	valuable	theoretical	underpinning	for	LIS:	
see,	for	example,	Robinson	and	Bawden	(2013),	Furner	(2013),	Compton	(2015)	and	
Dineen	and	Brauner	(2015).	Van	der	Veer	Martens	(2015)	makes	similar	points,	and	
further	suggests	that	LIS	may	have	contributions	to	make	in	developing	the	
philosophy	of	information;	a	pleasing	prospect	for	those	who	feel	that	LIS	should	be	
as	much	a	lending	discipline	as	it	is	a	borrowing	one.	
	
In	short,	Capurro	has	provided	analyses	of	the	information	concept,	especially	as	it	
applies	to	LIS,	which	offer	different	perspectives	and	insights	from	anything	else	
available.	It	would	be	particularly	valuable	if	some	clearer	reconciliation	between	his	
viewpoint	and	those	of	Popper	and	Floridi	could	be	obtained,	as	this	could	provide	a	
valuable	theoretical	impetus	for	the	LIS	discipline.	
		
	
The	LIS	discipline	
The	nature	of	the	information	disciplines,	and	LIS	in	particular,	has	been	another	
recurring	theme	in	Capurro’s	writings,	often	closely	linked	to	his	thoughts	about	the	
concept	of	information.		
	
He	has,	as	noted	above,	argued	that	the	central	concept	of	LIS	should	not	be	
information,	but	the	human	being.	He	does	not	suggest	that	a	concept	of	
information	may	not	be	essential	for	LIS,	if	we	have	adequate	concepts	of	data,	
meaning,	relevance,	collection,	access	etc.,	as	does	Furner	(2004,	2015).		However,	
he	does	suggest	that	the	concept	of	information	for	LIS	cannot	be	considered	in	
isolation,	but	must	be	related	to	other	important	concepts,	such	as	documents	and	
media	(Capurro	and	Hjørland	2003).	This	viewpoint	may	be	seen	as	linked	with	
another	of	Capurro’s	concerns:	that	LIS	should	have	a	strong	awareness	of	its	
historical	roots,	and	embrace	a	historical	continuity	of	development	(Capurro	and	
Hjørland	2003).	He	equates	information	science,	library	and	information	science,	and	
documentation	as	disciplines	which	all	grew	from	the	application	of	the	computer	to	
bibliography,	and	particularly	scientific	bibliography,	especially	in	the	Anglo-Saxon	
world	(Capurro	2009).	This	might	be	seen	as	an	endorsement	of	a	focus	on	
documents	and	documentation	as	a	central	concern	within	LIS,	although	Capurro	
does	not	seem	to	have	made	this	link	explicitly.	Capurro	and	Hjørland	(2003)	note	
that	information	science,	or	documentation,	was	originally	based	more	on	specific	
subject	knowledge	whereas	special	librarianship	relied	more	on	education	and	
training	in	schools	of	librarianship.	They	identify	chemistry	as	having	played	an	
especially	important	role	in	the	development	of	information	science;	this	is	
undoubtedly	true,	and	one	might	add	also	the	pharmaceutical	sector	(Bawden	and	
Robinson	2010).	Nonetheless,	Capurro	has	never	sought	to	privilege	the	information	
science	approach,	but	rather	to	argue	for	a	conjoined	LIS	discipline.	Information	
science	should	increase	its	awareness	of	social	questions,	and	free	itself	from	what	
Capurro	sees	as	a	one-sided	focus	on	information	retrieval	technology.	Joining	with	
the	tradition	of	library	science,	it	should	investigate	the	social	phenomena	
associated	with	the	communication	of	recorded	information	(Treude	2015).	
		
As	to	the	nature	of	this	conjoined	discipline,	Capurro	and	Hjørland	(2003)	note	that	
LIS	is	only	one	of	a	number	of	disciplines	which	are	related	to	technology,	systems	
and	processes	in	the	communication	of	information,	and	that	further	clarification	
and	strengthening	of	the	specific	identity	and	goals	of	LIS	is	desirable.	More	than	ten	
years	on	from	publication	of	this	view,	the	need	for	such	clarification	seems	equally	
apposite;	see,	for	example,	Dillon	(2007),	Buckland	(2012),	Lugya	(2013).	Capurro	has	
consistently	sought	to	attain	clarity	by	arguing	that	information	science	should	be	a	
hermeneutic-rhetorical	discipline,	centred	on	human	beings	rather	than	on	
technology	or	on	an	objective	conception	of	information,	and	focused	on	the	
communication	and	interpretation	of	meaningful	knowledge	(Capurro	1991).		
	
The	focus	of	this	discipline	should	be	the	production,	collection,	organization,	
analysis,	interpretation,	storage,	retrieval,	dissemination,	transmission,	
transformation	and	use	of	information	(Capurro	and	Hjørland	2003,	Truede	2015).	
This	has	been	described,	though	not	by	Capurro	specifically,	as	the	information	
communication	chain,	presented	over	a	long	period,	and	expressed	in	various	ways,	
as	the	central	focus	of	the	LIS	discipline	and	profession:	see,	for	example,	Borko	
(1968),	Duff	(1997),	Robinson	(2009),	Bawden	and	Robinson	(2016).	
		
It	is,	of	course,	clear	that	LIS	is	by	no	means	the	only	subject	with	an	academic	and	
professional	interest	in	the	components	of	the	chain:	computer	science	and	
information	systems,	publishing	and	journalism,	communication	and	media	studies,	
and	digital	humanities	are	only	some	of	these.	Capurro	and	Hjørland	(2003)	argue	
that	LIS’s	distinctive	contribution	is	provided	by	a	social	and	epistemological	
approach	to	the	information	chain.	The	computational	aspects	of	all	the	components	
are	primarily	the	concern	of	computer	science,	although	clearly	there	are	overlaps.	
	
Also	interested	in	most	if	not	all	of	the	components	of	the	chain	are	domain	experts:	
doctors,	for	example,	will	be	experts	in	the	interpretation	of	health	information,	
while	chemists	will	have	a	particular	insight	into	retrieval	of	chemical	information.	
Capurro	and	Hjørland	(2003)	express	the	distinction	here	as	one	of	LIS	professionals,	
even	subject	experts,	working	in	top-down	mode	from	a	knowledge	of	information	
sources	in	general,	while	domain	experts	must	work	in	a	bottom-up	mode,	from	a	
specific	knowledge	to	a	more	general	understanding.	This	is	helpful	in	clarifying	
matters,	as	more	disciplines	and	professions	become	evidence-based	and	
information-intensive,	and	take	on	a	different	relation	to	the	LIS	profession.		
	
Capurro’s	analysis	of	the	nature	of	the	LIS	discipline	is	convincing,	in	particular	his	
emphasis	on	the	conjoining	of	the	information	science	and	library	science	
perspectives,	on	the	value	of	the	historical	perspective,	and	on	the	need	for	a	
continuing	re-evaluation	of	what	is	needed	for	the	discipline	to	have	a	distinctive	
stance	and	value.	His	disentangling	of	the	LIS/computer	science	relation	by	avoiding	
a	focus	on	what	each	discipline	is	“interested	in”	–	very	much	the	same	things,	in	
many	cases	-	but	by	considering	their	respective	perspectives,	is	also	helpful.	
	
However,	his	insistence	on	a	hermeneutic-rhetorical	basis	for	the	discipline	with	a	
central	focus	on	the	human,	and	hence	a	firm	location	of	LIS	within	the	humanities	
sector,	seems	less	helpful.	This	location	for	the	discipline	is	probably	the	most	
common	one,	and	can	be	seen	as	placed	most	appropriately	within	cultural	studies	
(Furner	2015).	However,	Capurro’s	categorization	seems	somewhat	restrictive,	
inasmuch	as	it	precludes	some	seemingly	valuable	approaches.	It	may	perhaps	be	
better	to	regard	a	conjoined	LIS	as	a	field	of	study	focusing	on	recorded	information	
and	knowledge,	an	approach	more	open	to	the	variety	of	techniques,	perspectives	
and	forms	of	knowledge	needed	to	deal	with	the	complexities	of	its	subject	(Bawden	
2007,	Bawden	and	Robinson	2012,	2016).	Compton	(2015)	makes	a	similar	point,	
suggesting	that	LIS	will	best	survey	changing	times	by	maintaining	its	
interdisciplinary	character.	If	this	means	that	LIS	finds	it	difficult	to	establish	a	fixed	
position	within	the	academic	structure,	as	evidence	shows	to	be	the	case	already	
(Bawden	and	Robinson	2016),	then	so	be	it.	
			
	
The	future	of	the	library/information	sciences	
A	theme	which	Capurro	has	developed	more	recently	is	the	need	for	a	theory	of	
digital	ontology	and	digital	hermeneutics,	to	facilitate	understanding	of	the	nature	
and	consequences	of	the	move	to	a	digital	world;	a	theme	which	has	implications	for	
the	future	of	LIS,	among	much	else.	This	overlaps	considerably	with	Floridi’s	
‘philosophy	of	information’	and	‘infosphere’	concept,	and	has	led	to	robust	debate	
(Capurro	2008a,	Floridi	2008).	Another	notable	similarity	between	the	approaches	of	
these	two	scholars	is	that	both	see	ethical	and	moral	issues	as	emerging	as	a	natural	
and	important	consequence	of	their	philosophies	of	information;	see,	for	example,	
Capurro	(1985,	2008b)	and	Floridi	(1999,	2013).		
	
Compton	(2015)	has	analysed	the	differing	ontologies	of	Capurro	and	Floridi.	He	
characterises	Capurro’s	as	continental,	Heidegger-influenced,	and	oriented	towards	
phenomenology	and	hermeneutics,	and	Floridi’s	as	analytical	and	formally	logical,	
and	concludes	sensibly	enough,	that	both	perspectives	are	helpful.	Floridi,	who	
identifies	his	philosophy	of	information	as	spanning	the	analytic/continental	divide	
(Søraker	2012),	explicitly	notes	how	Capurro	brings	the	tools	of	continental	
philosophy	to	bear	on	information	concepts,	and	how	these	are	potentially	enriching	
for	the	field	(Floridi	2008).	This	has	been,	until	recently,	an	approach	largely	ignored	
within	the	information	sciences	(Cronin	and	Meho	2009,	McKechnie,	Serantes	and	
Hoffman	2012),	and	it	may	be	that	calling	attention	to	the	value	of	this	approach,	
over	a	long	period,	may	come	to	be	seen	as	one	of	Capurro’s	longest-lasting	
contributions.	Its	significance	was	noted	at	a	relatively	early	stage	by	Day	(2005).	The	
intention	of	the	chapter	authors	is	not	to	join	in	a	technical	philosophical	debate,	
which	they	are	ill-equipped	to	do,	but	rather	to	draw	attention	to	the	importance	of	
these	theoretical	issues	for	the	future	of	LIS.	
	
Capurro	emphasises	that	cyberspace	is	not	separated	or	independent	from	the	
physical	world,	but	on	the	contrary,	is	present	in	all	areas	of	life	(Treude,	2015).	It	is	
part	of	the	everyday	life	of	millions	of	people	and	integrated	into	their	bodily	
existence,	bringing	great	changes	in	spatio-temporal	social	experience,	and	moving	
participants	further	and	further	away	from	their	familiar	‘life-world’	(Capurro	2010).	
And,	at	a	relatively	early	stage,	Capurro	(1999)	was	recognising	that	these	changes	
required	a	careful	analysis	of	what	is	real,	and	what	‘real’	actually	means.			
	
While	these	considerations	may	seem	entirely	theoretical,	perhaps	even	‘academic’	
in	the	worst	sense	of	the	word,	we	suggest	that	they	will	impinge	on	some	very	
practical	concerns	for	LIS	in	the	near	future.	An	example	of	immediate	impact	is	the	
issue	of	information	literacy	(or	digital	literacy),	which	currently	assumes	
considerable	importance	in	the	practice	of	LIS.	Capurro	reminds	us	that	it	is	not	
sufficient	to	think	of	this	simply	as	a	matter	of	imparting	a	set	of	information	skills;	
there	is	a	need	to	base	the	development	of	information	literacy	on	a	rigorous	
examination	of	the	nature	of	information	and	its	role	in,	and	effect	on,	the	lives	of	
people	(Treude	2015).	
	
More	fundamentally,	as	the	digital	environment	develops,	and	as	ubiquitous	media	
systems	become	commonplace,	this	combination	of	pervasive	information	
technologies,	fully	multimedia	and	multisensory	interfaces,	and	increasingly	
interactive	systems	will	lead	to	the	development	of	immersive	environments.	These	
will	offer	their	users,	or	rather	participants,	individual	immersive	and	interactive	
experiences,	whether	for	recreation,	training,	aesthetics,	or	purposes	so	far	
unimagined.	If	recorded	and	stored,	such	environments	will	be	a	new	form	of	
immersive	document,	potentially	generating	new	forms	of	immersive	behaviour	
(Robinson	2015a,	2015b,	2015c).	These	will	become	the	concern	of	LIS,	as	has	each	
new	form	of	document	in	its	turn.	To	deal	with	these	effectively	will	require	a	sound	
theoretical	understanding,	and	this	in	turn	will	mean	that	we	address	exactly	the	
questions	which	Capurro	posed:	what	is	real,	and	what	does	real	mean?	Capurro,	
and	also	Floridi	(2014),	remind	us	that	this	new,	and	fully	digital,	environment,	brings	
new	questions:	practical,	conceptual	and	ethical.	There	are	as	yet	no	definitive	
answers,	but	it	seems	likely	that	these	philosophical	arguments	will	have	real	
practical	value	in	dealing	with	these	questions.		
		
	
Conclusions	
“Ghostly	technology	is	dreaming	us	…	reality	is	vanishing”	wrote	Rafael		Rapael	
Capurro	some	years	ago	(Capurro,	1999,	p	8).	Dramatic,	and	even	far-fetched,	
though	this	may	sound,	it	may	come	to	be	seen	as	a	realistic	description	of	a	new	
information	age,	characterised	by	immersive	documents	of	an	entirely	new	kind.	
	
If	so,	the	kind	of	rigorous	and	imaginative	conceptual	analysis	which	has	been	a	
characteristic	of	Capurro’s	scholarship	will	be	of	great	value	in	helping	LIS	cope	with	
this	new	environment,	without,	as	Capurro	reminds	us,	losing	sight	of	who	we	are	
and	where	we	came	from.	This	stands,	regardless	of	the	ultimate	place	of	
hermeneutics	and	angeletics	in	the	conceptual	bases	of	LIS.	If	the	LIS	discipline	is	to	
retain	its	unique	values	and	perspectives	in	the	future,	it	will	have	to	draw	
theoretical	strength	from	the	contributions	of	scholars	like	Capurro,	while	remaining	
open	to	those	who,	like	Floridi,	advise	us	from	outside.		
	
“Maybe”	wrote	Capurro	(2009,	p.137),	“we	are	in	the	process	of	leaving	the	age	of	
the	book	by	going	through	the	information	age	towards	the	age	of	messages	and	
messengers”.	If	so,	his	concept	of	information,	and	the	information	communication	
chain,	expressed	in	message	terms,	may	be	his	most	lasting	contribution.	
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Rafael	Capurro's	response	
Rafael	Capurro	gave	a	very	full	and	generous	response	to	each	article	in	the	book	at	
http://www.capurro.de/thanksandresponses.html.	A	shortened	version	of	his	
commentary	on	our	chapter	is	given	below:	
	
Thanks	for	your	clear,	concise	and	comprehensive	analysis	of	thoughts	on	the	nature	
of	information	science	and	its	foundations.		
	
You	write	"There	is	a	good	deal	to	be	said	about	the	relation	between	information	
and	entropy,	complexity	and	similar	physical	concepts,	but	it	is	not	yet	evident	that	
this	is	best	expressed	in	terms	of	messages	and	messengers."	You	are	right.	What	is	
missing	in	my	analysis	is	no	more	and	no	less	than	the	concept	of	time.	Three-
dimensional	time	plays	a	key	role	also	in	quantum	mechanics	as	Carl	Friedrich	von	
Weizsäcker	and	others	have	shown.	
	
With	regard	to	"Capurro's	Trilemma",	you	write:	"There	are,	it	seems,	two	kinds	of	
gaps:	those	between	the	concepts;	and	those	between	scholars	who	think	it	
worthwhile	to	bridge	such	gaps	and	those	who	do	not."	The	"gaps	between	
concepts"	are	in	fact	gaps	between	contexts.	Aristotle	is	a	master	in	presenting	
commonalities	and	differences	between	the	use	of	concepts	in	different	contexts.	
Take,	for	instance,	his	analysis	of	the	concept	of	middle	(meson,	mesotes)	in	physics,	
logic,	epistemology,	and	ethics.	
	
With	regard	to	the	importance	of	the	concept	of	document	...	you	write	"This	might	
be	seen	as	an	endorsement	of	a	focus	on	documentation	as	a	central	concern	within	
LIS,	although	Capurro	does	not	seem	to	have	made	this	link	explicitly".	This	is	not	
quite	the	case.	I	pointed	to	it	in	my	PhD	[thesis	of	1978]	where	I	defined	information	
as	documented	knowledge	made	available	or	"useful"	-	ready-to-hand	or	
"Zuhanden"	in	Heideggerian	terms	-	within	a	network	of	institutions,	media,	
instruments	for	classification	and	retrieval	and	the	like.	This	definition	is	not	only	not	
in	contradiction	to	Popperian	World	3,	but	includes	also	Worlds	1	and	2.	Popper's	
criticisms	of	"pure	facts"	and	his	insistence	that	any	observation	is	"theory-laden"	is	
not	dissimilar	to	the	hermeneutic	concept	of	"pre-understanding".	
			
Floridi's	"Philosophy	of	Information"	is	pretty	near	to	my	early	research	on	the	Latin	
root	informatio	and	the	Greek	concepts	of	eidos,	idea,	morphe	and	typos.	In	the	
course	of	time	I	took	a	self-critical	distance	from	it,	becoming	less	metaphysical	and	
more	existential.	Some	clarity	in	these	matters	might	come	from	a	thorough	analysis	
of	what	ontology	means	on	different	schools	of	thought	and,	as	in	my	case,	in	
Heideggerian	phenomenology.	An	analysis	of	the	question	"what	is	a	document?"	
should	reflect	the	epochal	changes	of	this	concept	in	such	a	way	that	the	word	"is"	in	
the	definition	should	be	always	hermeneutically	understood	as	an	'as'.	
	
...	I	am	more	curious	than	ever	on	how	information	science	-	will	find	its	place	within	
this	[an]	interdisciplinary	framework	(one	that	appears	to	me	more	like	a	labyrinth	
than	having	one	sort	of	rationale	based	on	a	common	language	and	related	to	the	
whole	of	reality.)	But	you	are	right	when	you	ask:	"What	is	real	and	what	does	'real'	
actually	mean?"	These	are	fundamental	questions	that	need	to	be	asked	again	and	
again	because	the	meaning	of	being	changes	epochally,	as	in	the	case	of	
Heideggerian	interpretation	of	being	(as	three-dimensional	time).	Thinking	of	the	
nature	of	the	real	from	this	perspective	means	to	be	able	to	look	at	the	changing	
essence	of	what	appears	within	a	field	of	possibilities	and	not	the	other	way	round	
as	metaphysics	tends	to	do.	
	
LIS	can	embrace	both	traditions,	the	metaphysical	and	the	phenomenological,	as	it	
has	to	do	with	the	reification	of	human	knowledge	as	well	as	with	its	use.	The	use	
perspective	is	the	practical	and	original	horizon	in	which	users	are	embedded.	
Information	science	takes	the	objectivizing	"present-at-hand"	perspective.	In	the	
preface	of	their	seminal	book	Understanding	computers	and	cognition	(1986),	Terry	
Winograd	and	Fernando	Flores	wrote	"All	technologies	develop	within	the	
background	of	a	tacit	understanding	of	human	nature	and	human	work.	The	use	of	
technology	in	turn	leads	to	fundamental	changes	in	what	we	do,	and	ultimately	in	
what	it	is	to	be	human.	We	encounter	the	deep	questions	of	design	when	we	
recognise	that	in	designing	tools	we	are	designing	new	ways	of	being."	This	was	and	
is	still	a	key	insight	for	my	LIS	research	as	well	as	for	my	view	of	information	ethics	
from	an	intercultural	perspective.		
	
